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I would first like to direct your attention to our Web site, our
award-winning Web site of the department.1 We have testified
extensively, both before Congress and before the New York
Assembly on TRIA2, on coverage and claims issues arising out of
9/11.3 If you wanted to add our testimony from the Assembly
hearings, we testified three different times since October 2001,
which really lays out the department's perspective, both on what
the implications of 9/11 were for insurance generally, but also
what TRIA would do or would not do. When you are eleven-anda-half billion dollars in the whole, you do not make a lot of copies
of testimony, but go read it online and you will see where the
department's perspective has been and where it has evolved. 4
Let me say this about TRIA up front.
TRIA is an
extraordinarily unique piece of legislation for two reasons. First,
it shifted some responsibility for issues of public policy and
recognized issues of public policy in terms of coverages and
natural security to the federal government definitively. 5 It said,
' Superintendent, New York State Dept. of Insurance. These remarks are an actual
transcript of the author's comments at the St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary
Symposium on Mar. 14, 2003.
1 http://www.ins.state.ny.us (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
2 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101-03, 116 Stat. 2322
(2002).
3 See STATE OF N.Y. INS. DEP'T, ANN. REP. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF INS., at 2
(2002) available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/acrobat/annrpt02.pdf (last modified Sept.
12, 2003) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT ] (referring to testimony
to Congress in 2002 expressing the priority to protect consumers and businesses from
liability exposure from terrorist attacks).
4 See id. (explaining the nature of the department's response to September 11).
5 See Peter R. Fisher, Implementing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,
Remarks Before the Worldwide Conventions and Business Forums Successfully Managing
Terrorism Insurance Risk (Jan. 29, 2003), at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releaseskd381
0.htm (discussing the key features of TRIA, whereby the federal government is placed in
the terrorism risk insurance business and shares the excess losses).
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we have a stake in this. The big underlying argument in TRIA
having been, what is public policy and what is appropriate for an
insurance policy. Also, what is the responsibility of private
landowners, property owners and insurance companies? So it
started to do that in earnest. In fact, even beyond the flood
program, which was really a uniquely federal program, 6 while
written through some insurance carriers under a write your own
basis, it really was fully funded by the federal government. This
really started to try and divide a split of responsibility between
the public sector and the private sector, and I think that is why it
took fourteen months to do it.7
Also what it did, it shifted the buying decision of terrorism
insurance coverage from the seller to the buyer himself.8 Making
a decision not whether to sell, but whether to buy. I think that is
an important shift. I am going to go into some of the claims and
coverage issues that are arising both out of 9/11 and out of TRIA,
but I think you can use that as a baseline fundamental shift in
terms of any legislation.
We have always mandated in
legislation that companies sell certain coverages. 9 But, it has
never been as clearly defined, as it is in TRIA, of an individual's
right to buy and an individual's right to have it made available to
them at a price that needed to be identified up front. That to me
has been significant and reflects the significant shift in the
insurance community since then. I think what is going to be one
of the great lessons of TRIA, and one of the great legacies of
TRIA, is the growing shift from the power focus being just on the
carriers and to not just the consumers, but really to the buying
public. Whether it is in trade associations or individually, as
constituents they have been given a great power with respect to
the legislation that was passed by Congress.
If you take those two things as precedent-setting events for
TRIA you do not need to ask any other questions about whether
6 See FEMA, About National Flood Insurance, at http://www.fema.gov/nfip/whonfip.s
htm (last modified June 30, 2003) (describing federally funded flood insurance).
7 See Homeland Education Resourse Organization, LLC, Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act, at http://www.homelandeducation.org/indexlb6e.html (last modified July 14, 2003)
(explaining TRIA's systematic sharing of compensation between the private and public
sectors for insured losses).
8 See id. (explaining mandatory availability of TRIA, whereby all insurers must
participate in the program).
9 See generally ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT, supra note 3, at 2
(explaining the general insurance coverage types and requirements).
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TRIA works, does not work or will work. Some claim success of
TRIA based upon the degree of company insurance carrier
acceptance of its terms. 10 Some of those provisions, particularly
the deductibles," are fairly onerous, depending upon what
situation or position you are in the marketplace. But, to measure
the success or impact of TRIA based upon whether companies are
using it or not is wrong. I think the lesson and the value of TRIA
has already been established.
As I have noted,12 TRIA will not work if the carriers do not
want it to work, and I think to some degree that is already
happening.
That in turn is now fostering some additional
legislative activity both in Congress and also in the statehouses
that I think you are going to see. 13
With that as the construct that you are suddenly moving to
this focus on the relationship between the buyer and the seller,
you now look at this continuum of coverage and claims from prior
to 9/11, past 9/11, past the TRIA enactment, and now that we
have TRIA. In addition for the next three years will have it, so
what does that portend for the marketplace? In this new
construct, in these shifting power dynamics between the two,
both legally and also economically, you will see some changes
come about. You can actually map the continuum. Coverages
and the effectiveness or the usefulness of coverages is oftentimes
in real lives in the claims process. The claims process in turn
will give you a new set of coverage dynamics. The process goes
on and on, inserting events like the 9/11 event itself and then
inserting again the passage of TRIA into that continuum. You
will see some of the dynamics that have taken place, and then set
10 See generally, Wade Financial Group and Global Asset Protection, Inc., Terrorism
Insurance and Risk Management, Implications for Clients Following Terrorism Risk
Insurance Legislation and Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, at http://www.terrorisminsurance-risk-management.comimplicationsoftria.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2003)
(highlighting how some insurers opt not to offer any coverage at all for properties they
believe are terrorism target).
11 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing how
TRIA requires insurers to provide commercial insureds coverage for losses due to
terrorism).
12 See Tamara Loomis, Rates Mixed After Terror Insurance Act, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11,
2003, at 1 (quoting Commissioner Serio implying that success depends on insurer
acceptance).
13 See Press Release, New York State Insurance Department, Department Announces
Agreement with Excess Lines Insurance Community to Offer Guidance on Terrorism
Insurance (Sept. 4, 2003) available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/p0309041.htm
(discussing guidelines carriers should use to limit terrorism coverage premiums).
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the stage for that next generation of that relationship between
coverage and claims. That relationship between coverage and
claims now of course, being influenced more by the buyer, having
more power in the scenario.
So we go back and look at 9/11 and at some of the claims
dynamics from 9/11 itself. We look at the idea of settling or
adjusting claims without certain documentation or records that
had previously been sacrosanct to the claims process.14
Particularly on the life side, but no doubt also on the property
side, lost documentation and records has created alternative
methods of adjusting and settling claims. 1 5 At the same time, in
terms of the coverage dynamic, since you do have that continuum
operating, perhaps you have new coverage requirements in terms
of how you protect records and documentations; Exclusions,
exceptions or endorsements for business continuity planning.
Also, disaster preparedness within individual insurers in order to
trigger coverages, and trigger claims settlements for lost
documents and records, particularly if both were destroyed on
9/11. You had massive destruction, particularly on life and health
where you had group policies, and the group policyholder being
the business, the employer being the primary repository of all
records on group life and group health policies. 16 Information on
group policies lost completely requires a new way of handling and
adjusting on health claims and on life insurance claims because
of that total destruction.
In addition, you saw firsthand the limitations and restrictions
on coverages that had been part of the lexicon, frankly, for
generations in insurance. Civil authority insurance, 17 business
14 See generally Press Release, Insurance Information Institute, Insurance
Information for Media Covering Hurricane Isabel - Insurance Claims Settlement Process
Begins in Affected States as Additional Adjusters Arrive and Claims Centers Open (Sept.
19, 2003), available at http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press.741940/ (listing necessary
documents in claim settlement process).
15 See eg. Martin A. Schwartzman, Empire Healthchoice, Inc. Summary of Recovery
Efforts Related to September 11, 2001 (June 10, 2002) (on file with author) available at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/acrobat/ebcbsOl.pdf. (discussing general counsel status and
how all litigation paper files for Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield were lost in World
Trade Center disaster).
16 See generally id. (discussing how vast amount of paper documents for audit, fraud,
legal, human resources, senior medical management medical delivery, and sales
departments located in World Trade Center were destroyed in disaster).
17 See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Introduces "Civil Authority"
Insurance Legislation, (June 4, 2003), availableat http://www.state.ny.us/governor/press/
year03/june4_03.htm (defining civil authority insurance).
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interruption insurance,18 assumed to be appropriate in terms of
their coverage limits and their coverage scope, suddenly
becoming overly restrictive, overly limiting, and restricting the
abilities of businesses to attain the level of coverage that they
needed, given the facts and circumstances surrounding 9/11.
You have, in addition, multiple payouts not working to settle
claims ultimately. What I mean is you had carriers putting a lot
of money out on the street, up front, early. Advances followed by
more advances, followed by more advances. Then you have these
multiple payouts without it getting any closer to resolution of the
underlying claim. That has now become almost a sub-topic in the
whole 9/11 situation because we do have eighteen , twenty
months later still some very hardcore claims that we still cannot
solve or settle. The carriers are saying I have already paid X
amount of dollars and cleaned up this property once, twice, or
even three times but I cannot continue to pay it. That certainly
goes far beyond what the original coverage terms required
anyway.
That also goes into the clean versus repair versus replace on
property claims.' 9 All these things are now subject to litigation
over whether someone should have cleaned the equipment,
cleaned the facility, repaired equipment or a facility, or replaced
it.20 Litigation is now taking place even after the intervention of
the department. Litigation over whether an individual should
have mitigated his losses up front by replacing equipment, only
to have a carrier say, no, that should have been done by cleaning
it or by repairing it. Suddenly where you find yourself is in court
over hundreds of thousands of dollars of investments and
battling between an insured who thought they were doing the
right thing, or hoped they were doing the right thing, and largely
doing it on their own. Now they are battling their carriers in
court over whether that was an appropriate activity or not.
18 See Insurance Information Institute, Do I Need Business Interruption Insurance?,
at http://www.iii.org/individuals/business/basics/interruption/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2003)
(defining business interruption insurance).
19 See generally Juan Gonzalez, Still in the Dark over WTC Dust, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 11, 2003, at 24 (discussing insurance companies disputing property owner claims
that property should be destroyed instead of cleaned).
20 See David Pilla, Sept. 11 Poses Many Claims Questions for Insurers, BESTWIRE,
Jan. 31, 2002 (stating whether damaged property should be replaced or repaired is
important in resolving insurance claims).
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Litigation itself is not providing any level of relief for a lot of
insureds who have conflicts with their carriers. Litigation helps
you win the battle, but lose the war. In terms of the amount of
time that it takes to finally resolve insurance disputes, many
businesses are out of business because they were not able to
resolve their disputes in a timely fashion. 2 1 That, I would
suspect, is losing the war even if you win the principled victory of
getting coverage or having a court tell you that you in fact were
entitled to coverage. The long-term implications coming from
that, require looking in the context of TRIA, not just from the
question about whether the secretary will decide that an event is
a terrorism event or not,2 2 but what is the undercurrent? What
environment are you applying TRIA to when you are talking
about claims that might arise from a terrorist event? Number
one, you have this acknowledgement of the power of the buyer. 2 3
The buyer has power to buy coverage that they want or do not
want. Second of all, coming out of 9/11, you have greater
regulatory activity. 24 There is direct involvement; good, bad or
indifferent, there is now involvement by the regulator in the

21 See generally Alan S. Rutkin, Unfolding the Layers: Terror Expenses May Follow
the Y2K Path, with Most Insureds Likely to Accept Terror Prevention as a Cost of Doing
Business, BEST'S REV., Mar. 1, 2002, at 64 (suggesting several reasons for plaintiff
apprehension in litigating September 11th related claims against defendant insurance
companies).
22 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(C), 116
Stat. 2322 (2002) (declaring that Secretary of Treasury's certification of, or determination
not to certify, an act as an act of terrorism shall be final and shall not be subject to
judicial review); see also Homeland Education Resource Organization, LLC, TRIA
Explained, July 14, 2003, available at http://www.homelandeducation.org/indexlb
6e.html (suggesting TRIA's definition of "an act of terrorism" likely excludes terrorism
committed on behalf of domestic interests, and the Secretary's decision to certify an act of
terrorism not being subject to judicial review or challenge is likely to be held
unconstitutional).
23 See generally Michael Prince, N. Y. to Require Refunds on Cancelled Terror Cover,
Bus. INS., (Mar. 21, 2003) (discussing New York State Insurance Department's
amendments in response to prevalent practice of policyholders canceling their policies due
to price fluctuations), available at http:/www.businessinsurance.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?new
sld=2140 (last visited Jan. 14, 2004); Wade Financial Group, supra note 10 (outlining
typical due diligence of terrorism insurance purchaser).
24 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 101 (declaring TRIA's purpose is to
contribute to the stabilization of the Unites States economy during widespread financial
market uncertainty following the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001); see also Laura E. Hannusch
at
& Suneil M. Thomas, Terrorism Insurance: Congress to the Rescue? (2003),
http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles
/file/00078/009098 (last visited Jan. 14, 2004) (stating that insurers exclusion of terrorist
acts from coverage after September 11th required Congressional regulation through TRIA
in order to ensure availability of terrorism coverage at affordable rates).
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marketplace. 2 5 In terms of claims adjudication, and market
facilitation, the regulator is now a partner for better or for worse.
We as regulators with our offices down on Beaver Street,26
became part and parcel of the business community affected by
9/11. We had, perhaps for the first time, a firsthand look, in
terms of what our constituents were going through, because we
went through exactly the same thing at the department. We had
our own disaster recovery plan, and our staff walking through
the mess that day. That has kept us through the last two years
focused on what our involvement should and could be with
respect to regulatory activism in the settlement of claims and
also in the procurement of coverages.
Greater coverage flexibilities are absolutely in high demand
right now. 2 7 While the carriers have a certain amount of rating
requirements, the dedication of capital goes far beyond the
question of terrorism, terrorism being one component to it. I
noted to Congress, back in September of '01, another terrorism
event was not my concern as a financial regulator. 2 8 The concern
was a hurricane coming from the south shore of Long Island due
to the kind of capital commitment that a natural disaster would
require, in the context of a large manmade disaster that we have
just experienced.
With that, you have greater coverage
flexibilities now covering the spectrum.
TRIA provides financial security to some degree for the
industry, but it does not really go to the question of coverage
benefits or coverage flexibility. What is it that the public is
25 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 101 (stating TRIA's purposes include
establishing Federal regulation to protect consumers, ensuring widespread availability of
affordable terrorism insurance, allowing private market stabilization during industry
adaptation).
26 See New York State Insurance Department, at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/hpoffnos.
htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004) (listing New York State Insurance Department address as
25 Beaver Street, New York, N.Y. 10004).
27 See generally Hannusch & Thomas, supranote 24 (discussing how unpredictability
of future terrorist attacks coupled with varying needs of property owners increased
demand for terrorism insurance).
28 See generally How Much are Americans at Risk Until Congress Passes Terrorism
Insurance Protection?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Gregory Serio) ("And so as we approach hurricane
season ... I think their concern is certainly more financial than procedural in terms of
their ability to get in and handle a large risk, something in the order of whether it's an
Andrew at $19 billion or something like World Trade which is substantially more.");
Before The Next Hurricane: Review Your Insurance Policy To See What Coverages and
Deductibles You Have, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 23, 2002 (noting that Hurricane Andrew was
the most significant insured loss until the World Trade Center attack).
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getting? We have gotten the power to buy, but what is it that we
are buying, and what is it that we can buy? I think that is what
people are looking for and demanding it to a greater degree.
There is a push for greater insured understanding of the
insurance process. That has occurred to some degree, but that
has also been tailored with a greater degree of frustration as
well. Wariness and concern over claims activity resulting in
adverse coverage decisions or decisions to underwrite based upon
your claims activity has been a dark side of the insurance process
forever. If I make a claim do I get canceled? Do I get nonrenewed? Do I get lesser coverage the next time around? It has
come into sharp relief and sharper focus here in the days after
9/11 because you're seeing this combination, but not necessarily
one that's connected, between claims activity and the loss of
coverage. 2 9 The loss of coverage coming from things that we have
all discussed earlier with respect to capital decisions, and
reinsurance limits or gaps. You may be able to draw an
illustration showing a connection between your claims activity
and your inability to get future coverage. While that connection
may not always be appropriate, it is certainly what has been
perceived to be the connection in the minds of the general
public-that active claims activity will result in some negative
underwriting decisions somewhere down the road. I think that
has now become one of the foundations for the future of
coverages, the way that we handle coverages and the way we
handle insurance risk in New York and elsewhere.
So we take the lessons from claims, from the limitations, and
from TRIA and we find ourselves in a situation where people are
looking for more and adequate coverage limits, more
compatibility of coverages to the risk that they have, ease of
claims management and settlement, and affordability. Not only
just short term, but long-term affordability, and long-term
stability of pricing in the market. It is more the legislative
activity that we are going to see going forward with respect to
coverages as direct consequences of claims. You are going to see

29 See generally ACORDIA, INC., APPLIED TO TODAY'S RISKS (2001), at 3, available at
http://www.acordia.com/img/assets/l086/Annual_l-12.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2004)
(stating that after September 11, 2001, insurance companies have been forced to seek
more restrictive, tighter markets with significant rate increases).
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greater use of self-insurance mechanisms and nontraditional
insurance products.
I am not sure Congress is going to revisit TRIA any time soon.
War has the mindset of the Congress right now and very little
else gets in or permeated into the Congressional thinking at this
point. But further than that, Congress said we have spoken on
TRIA, we have done it. You asked for it and we gave it to you, so
make it happen. I think you are going to see the activity go back
to the statehouses like it has in New York, where right now we
are looking at a major expansion of our captive statute. 30 It is not
so much to make it easier for those blue chip companies and
others who had traditionally been involved in captive
development and captive operation, but looking at the bill we
submitted last week to the legislature, 3 1 it will greatly expand
captive opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses who
have,
correctly
or
incorrectly
been
perceiving
a
disenfranchisement from the traditional markets that they had
customarily gotten their insurance coverages from. 32 They are
looking though for more than just coverage. They are looking for
ease of claims administration, ease of coverage retention, and
more generally affordable and more efficient methods of dealing
with insurance. 33
I have told insurance carriers before, we have now, not only a
more empowered, but a far more educated business community
buying insurance, working through claims processes and then
demanding greater coverages that suit their needs going forward.
Whether it is civil authority coverage, 34 which for a lot of
30 See Statement of New York State Insurance Department Before Assembly Speaker
Sheldon Silver & Assembly Standing Comm. on Insurance (Oct. 15, 2002) (statement of
Gregory V. Serio, Superintendent of Insurance, New York State Insurance Department),
available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/sp021015.htm,
[hereinafter Statement] (noting
that New York wants to move toward expanding captive insurance opportunities to small
businesses).
31 See id. (requesting swift legislative action regarding the bill submitted by the New
York State Insurance Department).
32 See id. (stating that the New York State Insurance Department's bill will expand
captive insurance opportunities to small businesses).
33 See generally Press Release, U.S. Small Business Administration, SBA
Administrator Joins Senate Small Business Committee Chairwoman Snowe, To Back
Association Health Plans For Small Businesses (Mar. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.sba.gov/news/current03/03-17.txt (noting that high insurance expenses place
enormous burdens on small businesses).
34 See generally Kathryn K. Jensen, Determiningthe Number of Occurences:Property
Insurance and the Attack on the U.S., CLAIMS MAG., Jan. 2002, at 29 (defining civil
authority coverage as insurance coverage intended to extend business interruption
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coverage issues was extremely limited, both in terms of its
waiting period and as well as its limitations,3 5 anyone who saw
lower Manhattan, some businesses were out of pocket simply by
civil authority interruption for six months, eight months, or at
least far beyond the periods of any insurance they had. The
uncertainty of business interruption and continued business
interruption coverages, both in terms of time and coverage,
particularly on your contingent business, interruption coverage,
has created a demand on the part of the public for greater
specificity of what business interruption coverage actually gives
them. 36 For many it is the absolute lifeline for their business.
Adverse consequences of a local event elsewhere is equally
important to a lot of businesses. They are looking for greater
flexibility with respect to how they get those coverages, but they
are looking to get this in a context of predictability of rate and of
coverage. I think that is why the surplus lines market, which is
largely the
unregulated
component
of the insurance
marketplace, 3 7 while it has come in to save the day in the shortterm, I do not think it is the vehicle for long-term stability,
simply because you have a lot of businesses that had been
involved in and had relied upon the regulated marketplace for
their coverage. Now they are no longer able to get that coverage
in the regulated market. That may have been the third element
of TRIA that was so important in that it covered the surplus lines
market and the regulated market as one and the same in terms
of coverages, in terms of having to offer terrorism, and in terms
of having to note what that coverage was costing. 38

coverage to circumstances in which the policyholder's property was not physically
damaged but was instead cordoned off by authorities due to damage to neighboring
property).
35 See id. (discussing the practical criteria and limitations of civil authority coverage,
including physical damage to neighboring property, interruption of business, and loss of
income due to the interruption); see also Statement, supra note 30 (noting that many
businesses have complained about the limitations concerning civil authority coverage).
36 See generally Statement, supra note 30 (noting that proposed civil authority
legislation would modernize and expand the scope of various forms of insurance coverage).
37 See Brian S. Martin, A Short Walk Through Surplus Lines, INS. J, (July 22, 2002),
available at http://www.insurancejournal.comlmagazines/southcentral2002/07/22legalbe
at/22918.htm (noting that surplus lines carriers are free from state insurance regulation).
38 See Jay Romano, Your Home: Terrorism Insurance,At a Price, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2003, at 5 (stating that TRIA enables private insurers to share risks of future losses from
terrorist acts with federal government, while these insurers must notify existing
policyholders of terrorism coverage availability and cost).
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We are going to see further activity in the statehouses. We are
also going to be pursuing how we can use the FAIR plan 39 more
effectively to handle gaps in coverage in the marketplace. The
New York Property Insurance Underwriting Association is
something that was created during the days when people could
not get insurance for inner-city risks.40 When the inner cities
were being burned to the ground back in the sixties, 4 1 the FAIR
plan was set up by Congress for use in the states. 4 2 The plan was
based on pooling of entities and interests in the insurance
community to cover those risks.43 We then used it again when we
had trouble on the coastal market. 4 4 We had an impending
mortgage crisis back in the mid-nineties,45 and I think once again
we are going to be pursuing ways to make the FAIR plan more
pliable, and robust. The purpose is so in the event that the
market does not respond, we then in turn move that
responsibility to the marketplace as a group to provide the
6
coverages that the market will not or has not provided.4
Whether it is because of the onerous requirements of TRIA or
because of other market dynamics, we need some safety net in
the marketplace like a FAIR plan for terrorism, and for
39 See Susanna McBee, HUD: InsuranceRedlining Widespread, WASH. POST, May 31,
1978, at A6 (showing that FAIR Plans assure property owners in high-risk areas access to
insurance).
40 See Joseph B. Treaster, Writing Policies in Cities Once Written Off: Protest and
Possible Profit Bring Back the Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1996, at Dl (affirming how
companies virtually wrote off urban areas in favor of suburbia and wealthy pockets of
cities, where insurers believed crime and fire risk were lower).
41 See Kimberly Blanton, What's FAIR in US Plan?, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23, 1993,
at 46 (elaborating how Congress set up FAIR Plans to sell insurance in response to 1960's
riots after many insurers left inner cities due to perceived risk).
42 See William Greider, GAO Says U.S. Insurance May Encourage Arsonists, WASH.
POST, June 11, 1978, at A3 (describing how Congress' FAIR Plans regulate insurance
pools in different states that guarantee property owners can obtain insurance in high risk
areas).
43 See Blanton, supra note 41, at 46 (stating how Congress set up FAIR Plans for
inner city residents to buy insurance for homes and businesses deemed too risky by
insurance companies).
44 See Arthur M. Louis, Insurance Coverage 'Crisis: GaramendiOffers Plan to Protect
Availability in State, SAN FRAN. CHRON., June 23, 1994, at D1 (showing California as one
typical coastal state with state-run FAIR Plan associations, offering fire and earthquake
policies to all Californians).
45 See Earnings Look Weak, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 30, 1998, at 7 (describing mortgage
situation in mid-1990s).
46 See Romano, supra note 38 (stating that TRIA as an example of sharing
responsibility, enabling private insurers and federal government to share risks and future
losses from terrorist acts, because insurers are required to offer terrorism coverage to
customers).
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commercial coverages. I think you will be seeing a legislative
initiative on that regard, not just in Albany, but in other
statehouses around the country.

